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Abstract
This paper studies information disclosure in a model of dynastic government. When information
about past policy choices comes exclusively from the reports of previous administrations, each
administration has an incentive to choose its (suboptimal) one shot expenditure policy, and then
misrepresent its choice to its successor. Consequently, it has been suggested that “horizontal
accountability,” i.e., a system of governance where auditing functions lie outside the executive
branch, can ensure credible disclosure of a government’s activities. This paper suggests a cautious
approach to that view.
The baseline model examines the reporting incentives of an external auditor who can indepen-
dently verify the information each period. Even with auditing, credible disclosure is shown to be
problematic. Various extensions to this baseline model are examined. In one extension, “liberal”
(i.e., those prefering larger government expenditures) and “conservative” (those prefering smaller
expenditures) regimes and auditors evolve over time. It is shown that “conservative” (“liberal”)
auditors are not credible when the current regime is also “conservative” (“liberal”). Moreover, be-
cause information transmission stops when the auditor’s and the regime’s biases coincide, eﬀective
deterrents even in the “good” periods (when the auditor’s and the administration’s biases diﬀer)
are diﬃcult to construct. In all periods the equilibrium requirement of auditor neutrality constrains
the dynamic incentives for eﬃcient policy choices. These constraints are shown to bind away from
optimal policies in standard constructions of equilibrium. Various ways in which auditing protocols
can overcome these problems are discussed.
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11 Introduction
A deﬁning characteristic of modern democracies is the periodic and peaceful transfer of power from
one regime to the next. For this reason, the “government” in democracies is more accurately char-
acterized as dynastic: the “government” is better modelled as a sequence of decision makers rather
than as a single, long lived decision maker. However, the disclosure of information across successive
administrations of dynastic government is not automatic. One reason for this is that a primary (if
not exclusive) source of information about past policies comes from previous administrations who
have the most direct knowledge of their own activities. Sometimes, governments have incentives
to with-hold information. Other times, the internally generated reports may be manipulated or
falsiﬁed.1
Does the credibility of a government’s information matter? Should a society care if its govern-
ment periodically “whitewashes” its policy history? After all, one might say: what is done, is done.
However, if credible disclosure does matter, what can be done about it? This paper examines these
issues in a model of information disclosure in dynastic government.
One reason credibility matters is that it is required for intertemporally optimal policies. In many
instances “one-shot” incentives of current decision makers favor ineﬃcient decisions. For example, a
ruler with limited tenure may choose lax environmental enforcement to keep current energy prices
low. Alternatively, the ruler may subsidize food prices rather than invest in infrastructure. In
both cases, these calculations may produce “present-biased” policies: decisions excessively favor
the present at the expense of the future when compared to a system in which rulers can recoup the
costs associated with eﬃcient decisions.
This type of bias also arises in ﬁscal decisions when the decisive voter’s preferences changes
1Examples of both with-holding and manipulation are easy to ﬁnd. For instance:
The General Accounting Oﬃce...said that it will ﬁle suit in federal court in the next two to three
weeks in an eﬀort to obtain records of the task force that developed the industry-friendly energy policy
President Bush announced on May 17. (Washington Post, Jan. 31, 2002, p.A4)
and
“Marines Charged in Falsifying Records: 8 Oﬃcers Names in Osprey Probe” (Washington Post, August
8, 2001, p.A8)
1over time. This is shown by the literature on dynamic, politico-economic models of voting such as
Persson and Svensson (1989), Alesina and Tabellini (1990), Krusell and Rios-Rull (1996), Krusell,
Quadrini and Rios-Rull (1997), Martimort (1997), and others. A diﬀerent but related type of
present-bias arises directly when rulers have dynamically inconsistent preferences — see, for exam-
ple, Krusell and Smith (2001).
In each of these cases, tacit cooperation between the diﬀerent generations of governments can
mitigate the bias. This cooperation requires accurate information about past policies.2 That is,
because current regimes’ decision rules must use knowledge of past policy choices in order to enforce
optimal policies across time, each succeeding administration must have reliable information about
what types of policies were chosen by past regimes. Conversely, if an administration can whitewash
its policy choices, then government will typically fail to make the optimal intertemporal decision.
Hence, what can be done to facilitate credibile communication across diﬀerent administrations
of government? One instrument of control thought to be eﬀective is that which is held by voters in
elections. While voters do discipline politicians for certain acts, we would argue that in the current
context, elections are at best inadequate.3 At worst, elections can reinforce rather than mitigate
a government’s incentives to lie. For one thing, voters may be just as inclined toward present-
biased policies as the politicians. More likely, voters often do not have the necessary information to
discipline a politician. Indeed, a disclosure problem would not exist if it were otherwise. According
to Tranparency International (TI):
“If the governors cannot achieve re-election through support of a satisﬁed populace, they
achieve it through a combination of secrecy... and the building of systems of patronage.
The governors may also indulge in short-term populist acts which may be to the longer
term detriment of the public. Not only will politicians tend to stretch the limits of
power and authority so as to govern with as little opposition as possible, in some cases
they will multiply their interventions simply to prove their own importance.” 4
2Tacit cooperation also requires an inﬁnite time horizon. Among aforementioned papers, Krusell and Rios-Rull
(1996), Krusell, Quadrini and Rios-Rull (1997), and Krusell and Smith (2001) study these problems in an inﬁnite
horizon. Tacit cooperation need not occur in their models because they restrict attention to Markov equilibria.
3In diﬀerent contexts, electoral accountability is shown to be eﬀective. Examples include Barro (1973), Ferejohn
(1986), Austin-Smith and Banks (1989), Persson, et al. (1997), and Maskin and Tirole (2001).
4TI Source Book, 2000, p. 24.
2Consequently, we deliberately abstract from re-election issues, and focus instead on the role of
“horizontal accountability,” i.e., a system of governance where auditing functions lie outside the
executive branch, for ensuring credible disclosure. The need for horizontal accountability has long
been advocated by human rights groups such as Transparency International. To these groups, ex-
ecutive appointments of auditors is “like asking the burglar to select the watchdog. [Consequently]
political appointments of Auditor-Generals have been the root cause of many problems with in-
tegrity systems in various parts of the world.”5 In the literature, justiﬁcations for various types
of horizontal systems (e.g., separation of powers) can be found in Persson, Roland, and Tabellini
(1997) or in Maskin and Tirole (2001) and Laﬀont and Martimort (1999).6
Starting with a baseline model, this paper develops a series of successively more realistic sce-
narios in which to study the mechanics of information provision by government across time. The
baseline model, introduced in Section 2, is that of a dynamic game in which successive “regimes”
that regularly occupy government.7 Each regime is assumed to consist of a decision maker with one
period of tenure. A regime’s preferences span the inﬁnite horizon, but it incurs certain costs and
beneﬁts only while in power. Each regime chooses an expenditure level without having observed
the prior history of expenditures of previous governments. This assumption captures the idea that
the present ruler cannot directly observe what happens before he arrives, and must therefore rely
on communication by past participants and observers. A related disclosure problem is examined in
dynastic repeated games by Anderlini and Lagunoﬀ (2004).
In the present model, a policy bias results from a, by now familiar, dynamic inconsistency. One
could interpret dynastic government in the model as a single, dynamically inconsistent player whose
rate of intertemporal substitution between the ﬁrst period payoﬀ and next period diﬀers from the
rate of substitution between any other pair of successive payoﬀ-dates. The decision process without
5TI Source Book, 2000, p. 75.
6However, explanations by Persson, Roland, and Tabellini (1997) and by Maskin and Tirole (2001) rely on the
inclusion of “vertical” accountability systems such the use of voters to discipline politicians (see TI Source Book, 2000
for a discussion of the diﬀerence between vertical and horizontal accountability). Laﬀont and Martimort examine
accountability issues with multiple regulatory agencies.
7Standard socio-political indices characterize the transfer of power among successive regimes as regular if
“persons not holding national executive oﬃce ... obtain such oﬃce through legal or conventional means...
change [of ruler] is not reported to be accompanied by actual or directly threatened violence or physical
coercion and that it conforms to the prevailing conventional procedures of the political system.” (See
Jodice and Taylor, (1983), p.85.)
3memory constraints is therefore equivalent to a particular case of hyperbolic or quasi-geometric
discounting.8 The analogy, however, is imperfect. Because the model here is of a sequence of
distinct governments, as opposed to a single, dynamically inconsistent one, the analysis lends itself
to the full set of dynamic game equilibria (subject to the reporting incentive constraints).9
In this environment it is straightforward to show that with full memory, simple trigger strate-
gies implement dynamically eﬃcient policies if all regimes are patient enough. However, without
knowledge of prior actions, there are incentives for each regime to choose a suboptimal (one shot)
expenditure. Credible information provision therefore becomes crucial for optimal policy decisions.
Unfortunately, but not surprisingly, disclosure is not credible if all information comes exclusively
from prior governments. In Section 3 we therefore introduce into the model an outside auditor
who can verify the government’s reports and actions each period. The auditor then must choose
whether to honestly convey this information to the incoming regime. Semi-independent auditors
such as the General Accounting Oﬃce (GAO) in the U.S. or the National Audit Oﬃce (NAO) in
the U.K. are common in most democratic countries. The model focuses exclusively on reporting
incentives rather than on veriﬁcation ability of the auditor. By having formal authority to audit
and substantiate reports of government activities, these auditors provide a potentially valuable
cross-checking capability.10 We ask whether credible communication equilibria exist in which the
reports of the previous regime(s) and/or the auditor coincide with their received information.
What we ﬁnd is somewhat surprising. The presence of an external auditor, even one that
can costlessly and perfectly verify the information provided by government, is not itself generally
suﬃcient to sustain optimal policies. Credible disclosure turns out to be a stubbornly diﬃcult
(though not impossible) thing to attain in dynastic government.
To understand why this is the case, one must ﬁrst understand the consequences of auditor
8Hyperbolic discounting models are part of a general literature on dynamically inconsistent decision processes
dating back to Strotz (1956) and Pollak (1968). Recent examples include Kocherlakota (1996), Asheim (1997),
Laibson (1997), Harris and Laibson (2001), and Krusell and Smith (2001).
9For this reason, the model is also less susceptible to critiques such as Rubinstein’s (2001) directed toward single
agent, hyperbolic models.
10In the U.S. where there is a formal separation of powers, the GAO monitors and audits the executive branch
on behalf of the legislative branch (see www.gao.gov). In the U.K. the Auditor-General is an oﬃcer of the House of
Commons (see National Audit Act of 1983), Section 1-2, or see www.audit-commission.gov.uk.
4neutrality. Auditor neutrality is a necessary condition for credible communication.11 According to
this condition, because all reports consist of cheap talk about the past history of policies, the auditor
must be indiﬀerent between the continuations that follow each of his potential equilibrium reports.
The auditor is therefore “neutral” with respect to each of his messages once the current regime has
committed to a reported policy. Unfortunately, auditor neutrality places severe constraints on the
equilibrium set.
It is noteworthy that auditor neutrality does not hold in standard models of cheap talk. See, for
example, Besley and Pande (1998), Krishna and Morgan (2000), Grossman and Helpman (2001),
and others, dating back to Crawford and Sobel (1983). In these models, the receiver can make a
direct inference from the reported information because it structurally varies with the bias of the
sender. That is not the case here since past history need not have any structural relevance to
present payoﬀs.
In Section 3, where the auditor is modelled simply as a “representative citizen,” we show that
auditing has no discernable eﬀect: only one-shot policies are sustainable. The intuition is the
following. On the one hand, as a representative citizen, the continuation payoﬀs of an auditor
coincides with that of the regime, and so a report that punishes the government for poor behavior
also punishes the auditor to the same degree. On the other hand, auditor neutrality must hold.
But the auditor cannot be both neutral and credible. Hence, the auditor will not report deviations.
Knowing this, the regime chooses its one shot policy.
Section 4 proposes some extensions that constitute more realistic scenarios than the baseline
model. Their purpose is to understand precisely just how severe is the auditor neutrality constraint
for the purpose of realizing optimal policies. Each of the extensions is shown to have certain virtues.
They are shown to be eﬀective some of the time and to a limited degree. However, we emphasize
that none of them are fully satisfactory for overcoming the disclosure problem.
First, we examine simple cross-checking mechanisms (common in contracting problems) and
ask whether these can sensibly be applied to the present model. Cross checking mechanisms are
eﬀective but fragile. They require unrealistic commitment on the part of both the government and
11I adopt this term from an earlier work (Anderlini and Lagunoﬀ (2004)) where the term is used in a related
context.
5the auditor. Next, we look at external compensation schemes, including side payments and career
concerns. These devices, we argue, are also fragile, and are typically ineﬀective in the dynastic
environment. Third, we examine a simple extension where auditors have preferences for honesty.
Clearly, a suﬃciently high payoﬀ from being honest at each date will work. Short of that, however,
there are limitations. Simple backward induction from a single less-than-perfectly-honest auditor
can destroy incentives everywhere.
Finally, we introduce heterogeneous biases in the payoﬀs. We consider an extension of the
model with two political biases/types. High types or “liberals” are those that prefer, on the mar-
gin, relatively larger expenditures. Low types or “conservatives” are those that prefer relatively
lower expenditures. This extension is examined more thoroughly in Section 5. It is assumed
that the biases of both regimes and the auditors are assumed to evolve according to a ﬁnite state
Markov process. Depending on the evolution of type-biases, an auditor in any period may share
the same ideology or have a diﬀerent ideology than the current regime. Auditor neutrality imme-
diately implies that dynamically optimal policies can, at best, only be chosen in periods in which
the auditing agency has a political bias diﬀerent from the current government. Hence, “conserv-
ative” (“liberal”) auditors never choose to credibly communicate when the current regime is also
“conservative” (“liberal”).
The interesting ﬁnding to emerge from this Section is that disclosure is problematic even when
the auditor has a diﬀerent political bias from that of the government. It turns out that past
information cannot be transmitted in those periods where the auditor bias coincides with that of
the regime. Neither the government nor the auditor will credibly report past deviations by previous
regimes of the same type unless punishments for past deviations have been exhausted. This means
that punishments for past deviations by the same type of regime cannot extend to future periods.
Hence, auditor neutrality implies that even in “good periods” where credible communication is
possible, one shot policies are chosen if these periods directly precede “bad periods.”
Moreover, in periods where the biases of regime and auditor diﬀer, auditor neutrality aﬀects the
incentives of future regimes with the same bias. In particular, auditor neutrality limits the type of
polices that can be used in any future punishment for policy deviations. Given this limitation, in
many cases a deviation by the current regime cannot be credibly punished by the future regimes.
6We show that under certain conditions, optimal policies cannot be sustained when deterrents take
the form of simple penal codes, a notion introduced by Abreu (1988) whereby all policy deviations
are followed by a uniform punishment. This is despite the fact that such deterrents are easy to
construct when reporting constraints are not considered.
Clearly, the results here are intended to be suggestive rather than deﬁnitive. What they suggest,
however, should constitute a challenge to the perceived wisdom that external auditing automatically
suﬃces for credible disclosure. There remains, of course, the possibility that auditing can be eﬀective
under more “nuanced” incentives. Non-uniform penalties such as “tailored punishments” might
be eﬀective. Section 6 concludes with some thoughts on this and other possibilities for eﬀective
auditing. Section 7 is an Appendix with proofs of the main results.
2 The Baseline Model
2.1 Dynastic Government
Government is assumed to be a “dynastic player” in the following sense. A “government” here
consists of sequence of regimes. For the reasons given earlier we abstract away from election
concerns.12 At regular intervals, regimes enter and replace their predecessors. For simplicity, we
assume that time is discrete and these intervals last one period. At the end of each date t,an e w
regime denoted by Rt emerges to replace the existing one. Hence, t indexes the regime as well as
the calendar date. One interpretation is that of a society with democratic governance, and the
length of a period is the length of a constitutionally imposed term limit. Alternatively, one period
denotes the tenure of a monarch. Neither interpretation, however, is required in the sequel.
R0 , R1 , ..., Rt , Rt+1 , ...
Figure 1
To start, this Section assumes that the type of government does not change with time (though
the identity of any particular regime does change every period). This allows us to focus on a dynamic
12See Section 2.4 for a discussion of re-election incentives in the context of the model.
7inconsistency before introducing the added complication of political bias. Examples of this type of
homogeneity in modern, democratic societies are not uncommon. Dominant political parties have
existed for long periods in Japan and in Mexico despite systematic elections. Nevertheless, the
homogeneous case may be viewed as something of a “warm-up” for subsequent sections in which
the extension to heterogeneous types, i.e., the possibility that distinct regimes evaluate policies
within a period diﬀerently, is introduced.
A “policy bias” occurs in the decision process of these regimes as follows. Each period,
t =0 ,1,2,..., the current regime must choose the general level of government expenditures. Ex-
penditure level at denotes the expenditures chosen by the date t regime. At each date, the current
regime is assumed to care about the discounted value of decisions of present and future expenditure
policies, but cares relatively less about future policies than the future regimes who choose those
policies. The average discounted dynamic payoﬀ to a date t regime is given by
(1 − δ)[v(at)+δu(at+1)+δ2u(at+2)+···...]
where both v and u are both assumed to be single peaked and strictly, diﬀerentiably concave, and
both attain their maxima at (ﬁnite) feasible policies. The parameter δ, which typically has the role
of a common discount factor, may also be interpreted as the altruistic weight assigned to future
regimes’ decisions. Though not modeled explicitly, the assumption of an interior maximum of both
v and u reﬂects an implicit balanced budget constraint: government spends what it taxes each
period.13
The payoﬀ u may be interpreted as the “fundamental” utility of expenditure a to a representative
citizen governed by these regimes. The payoﬀ v subsumes u but also captures the costs and beneﬁts
associated with governing. This presumably includes factors such as the eﬀort associated with
pushing through an expenditure through the political process. It may also include payoﬀs such as
rents from lobbyists and contributors and indirect factors such as the political popularity. If for
example, a denotes expenditures only on environmental protection, then the function v also builds
13The period-by-period budget balance assumption is not crucial for the analysis, but it is maintained throughout
the paper in order to avoid the introduction of payoﬀ relevant state variables implied by intertemporal budget
constraints. Such state variables can be strategically manipulated by one’s predecessor in government (e.g., Alesina
and Tabellini (1990)). The introduction of intertemporal substitution in the budget is an interesting complication
but does not add much to the core issue of disclosure (see Footnote 19 for more detail).
8in the political gains and losses associated with enforcing compliance with the law.14 Since the
current regime is not involved in future decisions, it cares only about the fundamental payoﬀ u in
the future. Consequently, the regime’s policy choices are distorted toward that initial period and
away from future periods. It is in this sense that dynastic government is “present-biased.”
Let α = {at}∞
t=1 denote the entire path of expenditure policies, one for each regime in govern-
ment, over the entire inﬁnite horizon. Finally, let αt denote the continuation policy path starting
from date t. Average discounted payoﬀs may be expressed recursively as:





(1 − δ)δτ−tu(aτ ) (2)
The dynamic payoﬀ in (1) generates a dynamic inconsistency between current and future in-
carnations of government. Indeed, the payoﬀ is a generalization of a single decision maker’s prob-
lem with hyperbolic or quasi-geometric discounting.15 To see the connection, set β(at+s,a t)=
u(at+s)/v(at). Then if β(·) is constant in all its arguments, the payoﬀ in (1) is expressed as
v + β[δv + δ2v + ···] which is the standard hyperbolic formulation. The decision maker is present-
biased since his rate of intertemporal substitution between the ﬁrst and second period payoﬀs
favors the earlier period more than under the rate of substitution between any other pair of adja-
cent payoﬀ-dates.
Let au denote the maximizer of u. The maximizer of v, which we denote by a will, henceforth,
be referred to the one-shot policy. We assume a 6= au. There is no presumption as to whether
there is “upward bias” (au <a ) or “downward bias” (au >a ). To illustrate either case, suppose
u(a)=K − (B − a)2 and v(a)=K − (B + C − a)2 with −B<C<B<b . Then, au = B, and
a = B + C.
A stationary path is a path α =( a,a,...) which replicates the same policy each period. Denote
by α∗ =( a∗,a ∗,...) the path which maximizes a regime’s payoﬀ V (αt) to a regime over all stationary
14The gains and losses associated with “pandering” are more fully explored in an interesting voting model by
Maskin and Tirole (2001).
15See, for example, Harris and Laibson (1997) or Krusell and Smith (2001).
9paths. Observe from (1) that a∗ is chosen to maximize (1 − δ)v(a)+δu(a) over all a. It is clear
from (1) that the most preferred outcome from the standpoint of the current regime is to “free
ride” by choosing a in the current period, and have all future regimes choose a∗. The problem is
that the one shot policy, which makes a regime better oﬀ in current period, also makes it worse oﬀ
if it is continued in all periods. In this sense, the resulting one-shot policy path, denoted by α,i s
ineﬃcient. All regimes can be made better oﬀ under the “full commitment” solution α∗. Hereafter,
α∗ is referred to as the dynamically optimal path.16 Clearly, V (α∗) >V(α). Every regime prefers
the dynamically optimal path to the one-shot policy path.
2.2 Why Credible Disclosure Matters
If each successive regime can perfectly observe past play then the model is a dynamic game with
perfect recall. This is referred to as the full memory environment. Using standard repeated game
logic, it is easy to construct subgame perfect equilibria in the full memory environment that sustains
the dynamically optimal path α∗, provided that all regimes are patient enough. The following result
is stated for completeness, although its logic is probably familiar to most readers.
Proposition 0 In the full memory environment, any path α such that V (αt) >V(αt) at each date
t is sustainable in Subgame Perfect equilibrium. If, however, each regime has no knowledge of past
policies, then only the one shot policy path α is sustainable.
The argument in the full memory environment is familiar. The path α∗, for example, is sustained
by a history-contingent “trigger” strategy whereby all regimes start out providing optimal eﬀort.
If at some date some regime deviates, all future regimes revert to one-shot policies. This behavior
constitutes an equilibrium if all regimes are patient enough.17 For example, using the payoﬀ deﬁned
in (1), the optimal path α∗ is sustainable if
(1 − δ)[v(a) − v(a∗)] <δ [u(a∗) − u(a)].
16Notice that the notion of optimality is with respect to the sequence of regimes rather than with respect to the
representative citizen. The latter would use policy a
u rather than a
∗ as the reference policy. The analysis could be
carried about with respect to a
u without loss of generality, but as it is easier for the government to sustain a
∗ than
a
u, the negative ﬁndings present a starker conclusion when regime’s payoﬀs are considered. In any event, we adopt
the term “optimal” with caution since welfare is problematic when government is a dynamically inconsistent player.
17Notice that the statement of the Proposition need not make explicit reference to discounting since the requisite
discount factor threshold is built in to the inequality, V (αt) >V(αt).
10Trigger strategies such as this one are fairly standard.18 By contrast, in an environment with-
out institutional memory, past deviations from prescribed behavior cannot be observed by future
regimes. In this case, equilibria requiring “punishments” for bad behavior clearly cannot be con-
structed. Consequently, if there is no mechanism for transmitting accurate information about past
policy choices, each regime chooses its one-shot policy a each period.
Naturally, it would not be accurate to say that modern governments have no information about
their predecessors in power. No such claim is made here. Instead, one need only emphasize that
current decision makers may have little or no direct knowledge of past decisions and must therefore
rely on reports, communication, etc., from past participants in the process.19
Consequently, this sequel examines the properties of dynastic government when institutional
“memory” requires intergenerational communication. Current actions are therefore reported by
members of the current generation to members of future generations.
2.3 Reporting by Government
Clearly, without direct memory, some form of communication is essential to sustain optimal paths.
Assume, then, that at the end of each period t, the regime sends a report mt to the incoming date
t+1 regime. In turn, the date t+1 regime prepares report mt+1 to its successor, and so on. Each
message constitutes “cheap talk.”20 Each regime is assumed to be able to manipulate all available
information including reports on past policies as well as current ones.21 The sequence of actions
each period are illustrated in Figure 2.
18For example, see Chari and Kehoe (1990).
19 If the model were modiﬁed to include state variables (e.g., expenditures on durable goods), then the analogue
of the one-shot policy would be the policy resulting from the Markov Perfect Equilibrium. Markov Perfect equilibria
admit strategies that encode these states, and so there is no question that strategies can incorporate genuine punish-
ments to some degree. However, it is not generally true that Markov Perfect equilibria encode a suﬃcient “amount”
of history to sustain the dynamically optimal policy path. Hence, credible disclosure in this model may be viewed as
attempting to bridge the gap between the Markov Perfect and Subgame Perfect equilibria.
20By standard deﬁnitions (see Crawford and Sobel (1982)), a report constitutes cheap talk if the cost of creating
report does not correlate with its substance.
21Most of the results do not depend crucially on this. Alternatively, one could have assumed that every report is
available, in an unalterable state, to all future generations. However, this seems somewhat restrictive.
11R0
m0 −→ R1




No restrictions are placed on the size of the message or on anyone’s processing capabilities. In
particular, a date t message, mt, may fully convey the history of behavior, {a1,a 2,...,a t} through
t. The incentives underlying all these reports may be expressed eﬃciently by a communication
strategy.A communication strategy is a mapping, µ, from last period’s report and the current
action to this period’s report. Write µ(mt−1,a t )=mt to mean that, given the report, mt−1,
received by the date t regime upon taking power, and given its current action, at, the date t regime
chooses to send message mt on to the next regime. A date t regime is said to report credibly if
the communication strategy µ correctly reveals the past as it is known by the auditor. That is,
credible communication entails
µ(mt−1,a t )=mt =( mt−1,a t ). (3)
Dynamic incentives for behavior are then expressed by a behavior strategy, which is a map σ
from reports to actions. Write σ(mt−1 )=at to denote the date t government’s policy choice at
given message mt−1. To set the system in motion, let m0 denote the null message which inputs
into the behavior rule, σ,a tt = 1. Using this notation, a path α is then deﬁned by
a1 = σ(m0),a 2 = σ(µ(m0,a 1)) , ...,a t+1 = σ(µ(mt−1,a t)) ,...,
Hence, the pair (µ,σ) describes the evolution of policy choices and messages of successive regimes
of dynastic government. Dropping time subscripts, a simple recursive expression for beginning-of-
period regime payoﬀs is given by
V(µ,σ| m)=( 1− δ)v(σ(m)) + δ U(µ,σ| µ(m,σ(m) ) ) (4)
where U is deﬁned by: for any message m0
U(µ,σ| m0 )=( 1− δ)u(σ(m0)) + δ U(µ,σ| µ(m0,σ(m0) ) ) (5)
12This formulation is analogous to many politico-economic models in that it expresses payoﬀs as a
function of the “state variable” — the message m sent by the prior regime — and the “policy func-
tions” µ and σ. The diﬀerence is that m is not directly payoﬀ relevant; it is used as a conditioning
device for strategies in the construction of the equilibrium which follows.
A communication strategy, µ, together with behavior strategy, σ, constitutes a credible com-
munication equilibrium (CCE) if all regimes report credibly as according to (3), and if, after every
message m, σ(m) maximizes (4), and after every message m and every policy choice, a, µ(m,a)
maximizes U(µ,σ| µ(m,σ(m) ) ). In other words, (µ,σ) constitutes a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium
(PBE) in which information is truthfully disclosed according to (3).
Our interest is in whether and to what degree information is transmitted accurately across
regimes. Does communication in a CCE credibly convey past actions? Not surprisingly, when
previous regimes are the sole source of information the answer is “no” for all but trivial equilibria.
This is stated and proved below.
Proposition 1 In an environment where information about past policy choices comes exclusively
from the reports of past regimes, the only path sustained by a credible communication equilibrium
(or any other Perfect Bayesian equilibrium) is the one-shot policy path α.
The proof is straightforward. It is included in the Appendix for completeness.
2.4 What about Re-Election Incentives?
One could, of course, argue that elections could overcome this reporting problem by providing
incentives to incumbents to report truthfully. In the context of the model, a representative citizen
must know the government’s action since the citizen observes her own payoﬀ u(at) each period.
The problem, however, is that u may be citizen’s expected payoﬀ. Speciﬁcally, assume u is of the
form u(a)=
R
x w(x)dF(x|a) where x, the actual beneﬁt, is a random variable conditioned on the
government’s action a. The distribution F is a conditional distribution with full support given
any policy a. In this case, only x is observed by the citizen, ex post. Since the citizen cannot
know which action a generated an outcome x, she must infer in equilibrium that correct action
13was taken. Hence, once the one-shot action is taken by the government. For this reason as well
as those discussed in the introduction, electoral incentives cannot be counted on to induce credible
communication.
3 External Auditing: Does it Help?
So far the model assumes that in each period, each regime is the sole source of information. Since
regimes have no incentive to report their own deviations, their reports are uninformative. Hence,
intertemporal incentives to sustain α∗ are destroyed. Government therefore has no internal mech-
anism for retaining institutional memory.
While it is indeed the case in some countries that there is no independent monitor of government
actions, it is useful to extend the model to admit the possibility that an independent auditor (such
as a GAO in the U.S. or NAO in the U.K.) can legally investigate, verify, and report on executive
branch decisions. For this to happen, the government must be held accountable in some form
or another. One possibility is that the auditing is done in a system with separation of powers,
whereby one branch of government investigates another (as in the U.S.). Another possibility is
that an independent agency has an explicit mandate in the country’s constitution (as in Finland).22
Assume then that an external auditor can perfectly verify the policy decision of the current regime
each period.23
For now, we assume that the auditor is assumed to have the same preferences as that of a “rep-
resentative citizen.” Namely, its preferences coincide with the “fundamental” preferences described
by u each period. The auditor therefore receives dynamic payoﬀ of U(αt)i fαt is the equilibrium
path expected to follow from t. We discuss some of the implications and justiﬁcations for this
preference assumption in Section 4 which examines various extensions.
At each date, after observing the policy choice at and the regime’s report mt, an auditor then
veriﬁes the stated information and prepares its own report to be disclosed to subsequent generations.
For the analysis it does not matter whether the auditor is an inﬁnitely lived agent or whether, like
22See www.cagindia.org/writeups/ﬁnland.htm.
23The analysis focuses on reporting incentives, and the qualitative results do not change if imperfect veriﬁcation is
assumed.
14the regimes, it lasts only a single period. To ﬁx ideas, the latter is assumed. In either case, it places
weight δ on the next generation’s payoﬀ. Let rt denote the report of auditor At. The sequence of













mt −→ Rt+1 ...
Figure 3: External Auditing Each Period
The auditor, like the regime, is not automatically assumed to tell the truth. An auditor’s strat-
egy then is a function ρ that maps from past messages, and current policies and messages of govern-
ment to the auditor’s report. Hence, the auditor’s report is given by rt = ρ(mt−1,r t−1,a t,m t). The
current regime’s messages is given by mt = µ(mt−1,r t−1,a t ). The notion of a “credible report”
can be extended from the prior subsection. The only modiﬁcation in the deﬁnition comes from the
fact that the both current regime and the current auditor must both aggregate the messages of
both auditors and regimes from the past. If these sources provide diﬀerent versions of history, then
it is unclear which version of history is the “credible one.” The deﬁnition is therefore restricted to
apply only when all prior messages/reports agree. Formally, an auditor is said to report (behavior)
credibly if, whenever mt−1 = rt−1,
ρ(mt−1,r t−1,a t,m t )=( mt−1,a t) (6)
A similar deﬁnition can apply to the reporting function, µ, by government.24
Behavior and communication can now be fully summarized by the list (µ,ρ,σ). The notation
extends in a straightforward way to recursive payoﬀs V and U deﬁned by (4) (5). Notationally, they
are now written as V(µ,ρ,σ| m,r) and U(µ,ρ,σ| m,r), respectively. A credible communication
equilibrium is a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium triple (µ,ρ,σ) which satisﬁes (a) credible communi-
cation , and (b) whenever all reports coincide, the government’s behavior depends only on the,
24Note that if past regimes and auditors have conspired to lie about past policies, then this lie may passed on
honestly by current actors.
15presumed credible, past history of policies. Note that a credible communication equilibrium always
exists: the path α is always sustainable by an equilibrium satisfying (a) and (b).
Unfortunately, the following result demonstrates that, without additional requirements, the
presence of an independent auditor who reports as described has no eﬀect on the outcome.
Proposition 2 The presence of an auditor who veriﬁes reported policies does not eﬀect the out-
come. Speciﬁcally, the only path sustained by a credible communication equilibrium is the one-shot
policy path α.
While the Proof is in the Appendix, the informal logic can be described as a conﬂict between
reporting and policy incentives. Suppose that an equilibrium prescribes an action at 6= at. Suppose
that the regime deviates by choosing its one shot policy, and then “lies” about it by reporting its
prescribed action instead. Ideally, the auditor’s role in this case would be to deny the government’s
report and, instead, convey the true information. But because the auditor has the “last say,”
the auditor must, in fact, be neutral in the sense that it is indiﬀerent between the consequences
of each of its messages. In particular, it must be indiﬀerent between the continuation following
the message, “the regime took prescribed policy at,” and the continuation following, “the regime
deviated by taking policy a0
t.” If this were not the case, then the auditor would send its preferred
report, regardless of the truth. This indiﬀerence, which we refer to as auditor neutrality, is shown




￿ m,r = m)=U(µ,ρ,σ
￿
￿
￿ m,r 6= m) (7)
Auditor neutrality is a necessary condition of any credible communication equilibrium. At the
same time, the continuation following the truthful message must punish the regime for deviating.
The problem is: since both the auditor and the current regime evaluate continuations in exactly
the same way, any continuation that punishes the regime must also punish the auditor. Hence,
credible deterrence conﬂicts with auditor neutrality.25 To satisfy both, imperfect correlation in the
25A similar logic was used in Anderlini and Lagunoﬀ (2004) and is also reminiscent of the renegotiation logic in
repeated games (see, for example, Farrell and Maskin (1989). Note also that this logic is not sensitive to the timing of
reports as long as they are sequenced. If the regime reports last, then the “neutrality condition” applies to it rather






























Figure 4: Auditor Neutrality
17continuation preferences between auditor and government is required. We discuss this possibility
in the next Section (speciﬁcally in Section 4.5) and again, in more detail, in Section 5.
4 Extending the Auditing Model
For a number of reasons, the auditing model presented so far is limited and somewhat unrealistic.
Here we examine, more informally, a few obvious (and possibly less obvious) extensions to see if
external auditing can make a diﬀerence in more realistic scenarios.
4.1 Cross Checking Mechanisms
An economist familiar with contract theory or mechanism design might observe that there is a
simple auditing mechanism which solves the problem. Suppose that the auditor observes the
regime’s policy but does not observe the regime’s reported information. Then a standard cross-
checking procedure provides the auditor with the right incentives to reveal the government’s policy.
The procedure works as follows. The auditor and the regime simultaneously send reports of
past and current policies to the next regime (see Figure 5 below). If the content of the reports
are mutually consistent, then the next regime interprets this information as the “true” history
and chooses the policy prescribed in equilibrium. If the reports are not consistent, then the
incoming government interprets the contradicting data as a “deviation.” Since, in the present
environment, punishments for deviations eﬀectively punish both the government and the auditor, it
is not important to identify which of the two messengers “lied.” Consequently, any path sustainable
in the full memory environment is also sustainable when an auditor is available and all parties can
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18Figure 5: Auditing without Observing the Regime’s Report
The study of cross checking mechanisms dates back at least to Maskin (1977). These mechanisms
are completely standard in contracting problems.26 The problem with this simple approach is that
it seems inappropriate in our setting. For one thing, most observed auditing arrangements do not
conform to the “veriﬁcation in ignorance” assumption imposed by simultaneous cross checking.27
More critically, simultaneous cross checking is extremely fragile. Both the government and the
auditor have incentives to undercut the perfect simultaneity of moves. If, for example, the regime
deviates to its one shot policy, then it has an incentive to preemptively “signal” its intent to lie to
the next regime. In turn, the auditor has an incentive to wait for this information. Hence, both
parties prefer to sequence their reports.28
4.2 Multiple Auditors
Adding more auditors is more expensive, but it may also help. Notice, however, that introducing
multiple auditors does not solve the problem if all the communication remains sequenced. For, in
such a case, auditor neutrality would apply to the very last auditor, and the result would remain
unchanged. In addition, the fragility discussed before is not eliminated. In real time, as soon as
the ﬁrst auditor preemptively “leaks” his report, others will do so in sequence. Hence, some degree
of commitment, at least, is required.
On the other hand, establishing the requisite commitment may be less of a problem. In order
for cross checking to work, at least two auditors must prepare their reports independently and in
secret. This is easier to achieve the more auditors there are. Moreover, it is arguably easier for two
bureaucrats to accomplish this compared to a bureaucrat and a politician.
26The adaptation of cross checking mechanisms to dynamic game settings with multi-sender communication is
somewhat more recent. Examples are Ben-Porath and Kahneman (1996), Compte (1998), Kandori and Matsushima
(1998) and Anderlini and Lagunoﬀ (2001).
27The following mission statement of the U.K. auditor indicates that reported as well as actual information is
examined: “The NAO [National Auditing Oﬃce] scrutinises public spending on behalf of Parliament....audits the
accounts of all government departments and agencies as well as a wide range of other public bodies, and reports
to Parliament on the economy, eﬃciency and eﬀectiveness with which government bodies have used public money.”
(www.nao.gov.uk)
28Note that the subsequent regime cannot necessarily condition on the timing of the reports per se, since the stated
timing can also be manipulated. Finally, the main conclusion (though not the details of the proof) hold up if the
timing of communication between government and auditor in the sequenced model is reversed.
194.3 Side Payments and Career Concerns
One might argue that by augmenting the auditor incentives with some insulated form of compen-
sation, the auditor can be provided with the appropriate incentives for disclosure.29 Roughly
speaking, a scheme with side-payments works as follows. Whenever the auditor reports that the
one-shot policy was taken, he receive a payment that makes him indiﬀerent between that outcome
and the optimal policy choice without the payment. In Figure 6, the distance XY is requisite cash
payment needed to ensure that the auditor neutrality is satisﬁed in order to sustain a credible com-
munication equilibrium. As with cross-checking, the sidepayment is, at best, a fragile mechanism.
The problem is: who pays the auditor? It is easy to see that an arbitrarily small additional pay-
ment is all that is needed by the current regime to induce a slightly bigger continuation following
a conﬁrmatory message.
Career concerns form another type of compensation. Dewatripont, Jewitt, and Tirole (1999)
have a thoughtful discussion and model of the role of career concerns in providing accountability
in government agencies. Using a multi-task agency model, they characterize the trade-oﬀs between
an agent’s “riskiness of ability” and his contractual incentives in the presence of career concerns.
Problems of intertemporal disclosure are not examined. However, they do speculate on how the
model might work in a dynamic context. Their work points toward a useful future extension of the
present model (and, hopefully, vice versa).
Nevertheless, the problem with career concerns, as with all methods of external compensation
is this: communication in the dynamic game is fundamentally diﬀerent from the standard (and
famous) Crawford and Sobel (1983) communication model. Papers that utilize variations of the
Crawford and Sobel model include the seminal works of Gilligan and Kreibel (1989), Austen-Smith
(1990a,b), Krishna and Morgan (1999), and Battaglini (2004). These all examine the credibility of
perfectly or imperfectly informed, biased experts such as lobbyists or bureaucrats. Full revelation
typically requires multiple experts who have diametrically opposed incentives. In the present paper,
the “expert” is the previous regime.30 The key diﬀerence is that in our case, the “information”
is the past history of play. The expert’s “type” in the present model is not correlated with his
29I thank Josef Perktold for bringing this argument to my attention.


































Figure 6: Side Payments
information, and so no direct inferences regarding the present can be drawn from messages about
the past. Hence, there is nothing to anchor an incentive scheme. In short, there is no independent
basis on which to judge the auditor’s performance.
4.4 Honest Auditors
Honestly, obviously, helps. How honest must an auditor be? In Figure 6, the payoﬀ to reporting
honestly must be at least XY in order to induce the auditor to reveal truthfully a policy deviation.
If all auditors are this honest, then, of course, external auditing facilitates credible communication.
However, even if most, but not all, auditors are suﬃciently honest, eﬃcient policies may not
result. We sketch the argument informally. Consider a candidate CCE that sustains α∗. Suppose
that a certain auditor is not likely to derive suﬃcient payoﬀ from honest reporting at some date
t. Then it will not report any current or past policy departures from a∗. Knowing this, the
21government at date t chooses its one-shot policy a regardless of history. But if this is expected,
then the government at date t−1, realizing that future punishments will not occur also chooses a,
and the equilibrium unravels.
The best hope, it seems, for sustaining α∗ is for an auditor’s payoﬀ from honest reporting to
be unobserved but suﬃciently high in expectation. Type unobservability also aids the eﬀectiveness
of cross checking. When one’s partner in a cross checking mechanism is likely to be honest, a
preemptively signal is less likely to work. Hence it is less likely to be attempted.
4.5 Heterogeneous Biases
Perhaps the most obvious limitation of the auditing model thus far is that the auditor is “repre-
sentative.” Because there is no heterogeneity in the way future policies are evaluated, this leads
to the conclusion that the government and auditor evaluate continuation payoﬀs in the same way.
Can external auditing work if there is preference heterogeneity? In the simplest possible extension,
assume all decision makers (regimes and auditors) are one of two political ideologies: “High” or
“Low.” These ideologies are referred to as “biases” or just “types.” Assume duH/da > duL/da
and dvH/da > dvL/da for all a. That is, for high types an incremental increase in expenditures is
more highly valued than for low types, and the optimal fundamental policy for high types is always
higher than for their counterpart for low types. In this sense, the high types may be regarded
as having a “liberal” bias while the low types have a “conservative” bias.31 This assumption, in
turn, implies a similar ordering for one shot optimal policies and for dynamically optimal policies,
respectively: a∗
H >a ∗
L, and aH >a L.
Let ait denote a policy taken by a regime of type i in period t. One immediate implication from
the previous Section is that sustainability of optimal paths requires that the bias-type of auditor
diﬀers from that of the current regime. Formally,
Proposition 3 In an environment with heterogeneous government subject to independent auditing,
a path α is sustainable only if, for each type i = H,L and in each period t for which ait 6= ait, the
31However, these terms require some caution. For example, policy a may also correspond to some measure of
defense spending.
22type of the auditor diﬀers from i. Consequently, ait = ait whenever the regime’s and the auditor’s
type coincide.
In words, only one shot policies are chosen when there is no diﬀerence in type bias. This is
true regardless of the history leading up to that state. The proof is immediate from Proposition 2.
Ironically, because of auditor neutrality, diﬀerences in ideological views between the auditor and
the government is necessary to combat diﬀerences in time horizon views between governments of
diﬀerent cohorts.
One possible criticism is that the result is, in a certain sense, “knife-edged.” Do reporting
incentives break down fully only when auditor type exactly coincides with the government’s current
bias? The answer is “no.” In fact, for a ﬁxed discount factor, when there are a continuum of biases,
this result holds for approximate rather than exactly coincident bias as well. When the biases are
close, then punishments that satisfy the indiﬀerence condition for the auditor cannot be constructed
unless the discount factor is suﬃciently close to unity. Hence, for a ﬁxed discount factor, if the bias
diﬀerence between a “liberal” (“conservative”) regime and an auditor is suﬃciently close, then the
conclusion of Proposition 3 can be shown. Namely, only one shot policies are sustainable in states
where “liberal” (“conservative”) regimes and auditors are matched.
The obvious extension is then to a scenario where the ideological biases of government and
auditor diﬀer substantially. We take this up in the next section.
5 Dynamically Heterogeneous Biases
We investigate heterogeneous biases when these biases evolve over time. Speciﬁcally, assume that
types evolve according to a ﬁnite state Markov process with transition probability P deﬁned on state
space Ω. Each state ω ∈ Ω jointly determines the identity of the current regime and the identity
of the current auditor at the beginning of the period. The transition probability of reaching state
ω0 from state ω is given by P(ω0|ω). For convenience, it is assumed that P(ω0|ω) > 0 for any pair
of states. It is also assumed that P is of full rank. The initial state is denoted by ω0.
This speciﬁcation for transition of power implies that the outcome of any election/transition is
23independent of the current government’s behavior. This assumption is less restrictive than it ap-
pears. If the current government’s behavior cannot be immediately observed without veriﬁcation,
then the outcome of the election rests on demographic factors and changes in political attitudes.32
The stochastic process governing regime types is therefore modeled as a reduced form for an un-
derlying political process that determines the bias of current leaders. Whether “conservative” or
“liberal” leaders prevail depends on demographics of the voting population (which is beyond the
scope of this analysis). We oﬀer no theory for how this process relates to the one determining the
bias of the auditor.
A strategy triple (µ,ρ,σ) deﬁned in the prior Section can now be extended to depend on states.
Formally, policies and reports are now determined by: a = σ(m,r;ω),m 0 = µ(m,r,a;ω), and
r0 = ρ(m,r,a,m 0;ω), respectively. The deﬁnition of credible communication in (6) easily extends
to these strategies. With this notation, the payoﬀ to a date t regime of type i = H,L is:
Vi(µ,ρ,σ
￿





￿ ￿ m0,r0,ω0 ) (8)
As before, each strategy triple (µ,ρ,σ) induces a path α which is now a random sequence of
expenditure policies. The realization of each policy at in the sequence depends on the realized state
ωt. Clearly, there are now multiple, stationary “full commitment paths” paths. Call a stationary
path optimal if it is a solution to
max
a β [δuH(a)+( 1− δ)vH(a)] + (1 − β)[ δuL(a)+( 1− δ)vL(a)].
where β ∈ [0,1]. Note that most type-stationary paths — paths in which every regime of a given
type always takes the same action — are ineﬃcient from all regimes’ point of views since they fail
to optimally smooth payoﬀs streams between the two types.
In the full memory environment, it is straightforward to establish that certain optimal paths are
sustainable. In particular, those that are preferred by every regime in every state to the mutual one-
shot policy path (in which every regime chooses its one-shot policy), are sustained by the obvious
32A similar political transition dynamic was speciﬁed by Dixit, Grossman, and Gul (2000) in order to study political
compromise in a dynamic game of surplus division between two factions.
24trigger strategies if the regimes are patient enough.33
In the environment where past policies become known only through communication, possibilities
are more limited. Let Ωij denote the set of all states in which regime i = H,L holds power and is
audited by j = H,L. Clearly, there are four such sets, ΩHH, ΩHL, ΩLH and ΩLL which exhaust
the set Ω.
As shown by Proposition 3, the requirement of auditor neutrality conﬂicts with the requirement
of credible deterrence if there is no type diﬀerence between the auditor and the regime. Since only
one shot policies are sustainable on states in ΩHH or ΩLL, no stationary optimal path is sustainable.
The “second best” in this case is the set of paths which are stationary on the “good” states
in ΩHL ∪ ΩLH. i.e., states in which the auditor’s and regime’s biases diﬀer. Unfortunately, the
requirement of auditor neutrality places constraints on policy choices even in the good states. We
highlight two of these constraints in particular.
First, the presence of “bad” states (i.e., those in ΩHH ∪ΩLL) inhibits policy incentives in good
states. Whenever a state in, say, ΩHH occurs, neither the high type of government nor the high
type of auditor will credibly report past deviations by previous regimes of the same type unless
punishments for past deviations have been exhausted. Hence punishments for past deviations by
the same type of regime cannot extend to future states that are reached from Ωii. Information
transmission is therefore possible only if the states in Ωii do not occur too “often.”
This same constraint implies that states in ΩHH ∪ΩLL are not too “predictable.” Suppose, for
example, the type-bias process is deterministic. Then deviations by a type H regime at date t
cannot be deterred if in date t + 1 the state is ΩHH. However, this implies that deviations by a
type H regime at date t − 1 cannot be deterred, and so on.
A second constraint arises because eﬀective deterrents against policy deviations require the
cooperation of future regimes that have the same bias as the deviator. Normally, equilibria in
dynamic environment “build in” the one shot incentives into the equilibrium so that the problem
of “punishing one’s self” does not arise. Here, however, the problem does arise dues to auditor
33In fact, payoﬀs worse than the one-shot policy may be sustainable since a deviation by, say, type L does not
require future type H’s to punish themselves (thus possibly rewarding type L’s).
25neutrality.
We say a credible communication equilibrium, (µ,ρ,σ), is simple if, for all states in Ωij, for any
type of policy deviation by regime i, the same “punishment” continuation path is prescribed, and
each such path is comprised of ﬁnitely many policies. Simple equilibria were introduced formally by
Abreu (1988) and are sometimes referred to by their paths as simple penal codes. These equilibria
do not discriminate between the type of deviation or the speciﬁc state. With full information, they
do not need to. With full information, a path which is a suﬃcient deterrent against the maximal
deviation in the worst possible state will also suﬃce against any other deviation in any other state.
However, when credible communication constraints are factored in, simple equilibria cannot sustain
the stationary paths on the good states.
Proposition 4 Consider a path α∗∗ for this environment that yields a stationary optimal expen-
diture policy a∗∗ in all states ω ∈ ΩHL ∪ ΩLH.L e t˜ aj be a policy that satisﬁes: uj(˜ a)=uj(a∗∗).
Now let Yi denote the random time at which a type i government is next audited by a type j 6= i
auditor before the ﬁrst time at which the type i government and auditor are matched.34 Suppose
that for each type i = H,L,







[ui(a∗∗) − ui(˜ aj)] (9)
Then no simple, credible communication equilibrium can sustain α∗∗.
Proposition 4 asserts that auditing is not eﬀective in standard constructions of equilibrium if (9)
holds. To better understand the meaning of the result and the role of Inequality (9), we compare
the incentives to punish a deviating government under full information to incentives to punish with
auditing. To keep things simple, suppose that only states in Ωij, i.e, a type i government is audited
by a type j auditor, occur. Under full information, the typical prescribed punishment path for a
type i government is
T periods of punishment
z }| {
ai,a i,a i ,... ,a i ,a ∗∗,a ∗∗ ...
34A formal construction of Yi is found in the Proof in the Appendix.
26The key thing to observe is that optimizing behavior is built into the punishment. That is, the type
i deviant cannot be expected to carry out his own punishment. Hence, ai is both a punishment
and a one-shot best response for type i.35
By contrast, in the present variant of the auditing model, a candidate punishment path for a
type i government is
T periods of punishment
z }| {
˜ aj,˜ aj,˜ aj ,... ,˜ aj ,a ∗∗,a ∗∗ ... (10)
Notice that ˜ aj must be used as the punishment. This follows from auditor neutrality. Recall that
the auditor of type j must be indiﬀerent between the message inducing equilibrium policy a∗∗ and
the punishment policy ˜ aj. Hence, uj(˜ aj)=uj(a∗∗). The problem with this punishment path is that
it no longer builds in optimizing behavior of the type i deviant. Consequently, if type i deviates




T periods of punishment
z }| {
˜ a,˜ aj, ,... ,˜ aj ,a ∗,a ∗ ... (11)
An upper bound on the diﬀerence between (11) and (10) is







[ui(a∗∗) − ui(˜ aj)].
Consequently, the original deviator will ﬁnd it proﬁtable to deviate from carrying out his own
punishment if (9) holds.
The result indicates that the auditor’s neutrality imposes constraints even in the “good periods”
in which auditor and regime bias are diﬀerent. The intuition above suggests, though it is hard to
prove, that the constraint will apply for general types of equilibria. This remains an open question,
though Section 6 oﬀers some ideas.
6 Some Positive Conclusions
This paper examines the mechanics of information provision necessary to overcome a dynamic
policy bias. We have argued that electoral accountability is not an eﬀective substitute for external
35The property that punishments must incorporate one-shot behavior by the deviating agent (e.g., in the minmax
payoﬀ) is extremely robust in standard repeated games. It must hold if payoﬀs are bounded below.
27auditing when information has intertemporal consequences. The main ﬁndings portray diﬃculties
in establishing credible disclosure over time even in the presence of an auditor.
The results are not intended to suggest that auditing is never eﬀective. For example, the
cross checking mechanism does work. However, it requires substantial commitment without which
preemption incentives undercut the putative equilibrium. The introduction of multiple auditors
may help if at least two auditors can commit to prepare their reports independently. Without this
commitment, preemption incentives exist here too.
Moreover, the preemption incentives under cross checking may be mitigated when auditing types
are heterogeneous and kept secret. A government is less likely to preemptively send its message
if it is unsure of which type of auditor it faces. (Again, forced secrecy requires some commitment
since auditors may preemptively signal their type at the policy stage).
Another possibility for eﬀective auditing exists when types are heterogeneous. Although The-
orem 4 demonstrates limitations with the standard construction of equilibrium, we cannot rule
out the possibility that a more delicate incentive structure will work. What might this look like?
An equilibrium that is not simple requires punishments that are tailored to deviations. Take, for
example, disclosure of policies with international consequences. A recent model by Lagunoﬀ and
Matsui (2004) examine overlapping generations games between dynastic organizations. They prove
a Folk Theorem when history is publicly communicated asynchronously from the old decision maker
in an organization to his successor. There it is shown that credible communication equilibria exist
to sustain any feasible payoﬀ of the stage game if the dynasties are patient. Signiﬁcantly, the
construction of equilibria in that model are not simple, and require punishments that are delayed
over possibly many generations. Though the analogy to the current model is imperfect, a similar
incentive structure might be applicable to international policies (e.g., tariﬀ reductions) brokered
between multiple governments, each with the ability to audit the other.
These and other possibilities are left for future research. The disclosure problems identiﬁed here
may indicate the further research is indeed warranted.
287 Appendix: Proofs of the Results
Proof of Propsotion 1 Suppose, by contradiction, that path α is sustained by a credible com-
munication equilibrium (σ,µ) and α satisﬁes at 6= a for some t. Let ˜ mt denote the equilibrium path
message indicating that at was taken in period t as prescribed. The equilibrium payoﬀ to taking
at and subsequently reporting ˜ mt is given by
V (αt)=( 1− δ)v(at)+δ U(µ,σ| ˜ mt ))
But by taking instead the one shot policy a at date t then sending ˜ mt just the same, the date t
regime receives
(1 − δ)v(a)+δ U(µ,σ| ˜ mt )) >V (αt).
Hence, the path α is not sustainable. ♦
Proof of Proposition 2 Let (µ,ρ,σ) denote a credible communication equilibria that sustains
path α with at 6= at for some t. In the credible communication equilibrium, the date t regime and
auditor sends messages mt and rt, respectively, if the regime takes the prescribed policy at.I f ,
however, the regime deviates in policy choice by taking at, then alternative messages, say, mt and
rt are to be sent. Since the one shot policy at is preferred in period t, the current regime is deterred
from choosing it only if
U(µ,ρ,σ| mt,r t ) > U(µ,ρ,σ| mt,rt ) (12)
That is, the continuation starting in period t +1 after credible reports must punish the regime for
a deviation.
Now suppose instead, that after “deviant” policy choice at the current regime sends the “no
deviation” message mt. Observe that the continuation payoﬀs to the auditor of the path starting
at date t + 1 must satisfy:
U(µ,ρ,σ| mt,r t )= U(µ,ρ,σ| mt,rt ) (13)
For if the left side of this expression exceeded the right side, then the auditor would send rt even
though the regime had, in fact, deviated in policy choice. In such a case, the regime would surely
choose its one shot policy at. On the other hand, if the right side exceeded the left, then the auditor
29would signal a policy deviation with rt even if the regime had not deviated and was truthful in its
message.
Given expressions, (12) and (13), it is clear that the regime should deviate take at then deviate
to mt in the communication stage. Since (13) describes continuations for both the regime and
the auditor, the regime is unaﬀected by the response of the auditor. By establishing a successful
deviation, the premise that (µ,ρ,σ) is a credible communication equilibria is contradicted. ♦
Proof of Proposition 4
Before proceeding the the proof, we require the following constructs to formally derive the
random variable Yij. The following standard notation from the theory of Markov chains will prove
useful.36 For each i,j = H,L, The ﬁrst passage time to states in Ωij is given by
T1
ij = inf{t>0: ωt ∈ Ωij},
and the nth passage time37 by
Tn
ij = inf{t>Tn−1
ij : ωt ∈ Ωij}.
Note that by the independent increments property of Markov chains the expected ﬁrst passage time
E[T1
ij| ω] from a state ω, is also the average delay until the state next enters Ωij.
Clearly, information about a deviation by type i can only ﬂow if along paths that avoid states
in Ωii. The ﬁrst passage into these states is given by T1
ii. Consequently, optimal policies can, at
best, be sustained on the conditional passage times, denoted by {Y n
ij}, where Y n
ij is the conditional
passage time representing the nth passage into Ωij before the ﬁrst passage into Ωii. Formally, set
Y 0




ij : ωt ∈ Ωij}. (14)
The random variable Y n
ij is the nth time at which government of type i is audited by auditor of
type j 6= i before very the ﬁrst time that a type i government is also audited by an auditor of type
i. Observe that by our notation, Yi = min{Y 1
ij,Y1
ji}.
36A standard source is Norris (1997).
37The standard convention is inf ∅ = ∞.
30We now proceed with the proof. Without loss of generality, suppose that ai <a u
i ,i = H,L so
that each regime’s preference is downward (rather than upward) biased regardless of type-bias. An
analogous argument exists when biases are upward. Now suppose by contradiction that (µ,ρ,σ)
is a simple, credible communication equilibrium that sustains a stationary optimal policy a∗∗ in
states ω ∈ ΩHL ∪ ΩLH.
By a slight abuse of notation, we express payoﬀs Vi(µ,ρ,σ| m,r;ω) and Ui(µ,ρ,σ| m,r;ω)i n
terms of their induced equilibrium paths, Vi(α;ω) and Ui(α;ω), respectively.
By the previous Proposition, one shot policies ai, i = H,L, are always taken in states in ΩHH
and ΩLL. Therefore, without loss of generality all references to “paths” below are restricted to
policy choices in the states in ΩHL ∪ ΩLH, i.e., those with conﬂicting ideological bias. Observe,
then, that any expected continuation value may be written as a discounted sum of utilities of





















￿ ￿ ω] is the expectation over next period’s state ω0 conditioned this period’s state ω. (Note
that the conditional passage times, Y n
ij, rather than unconditional passage times, are used in (15)
since information about current policies does not extend beyond the ﬁrst passage time in Ωii.)
Now observe that for any two states ω and ˆ ω by the stationarity of the equilibrium path








Now ﬁx any state ω ∈ ΩLH so that the low type of regime is matched with a high type of
auditor. In order to constitute a credible communication equilibrium, (µ,ρ,σ) must satisfy (a) the
type L regime takes the prescribed policy in that period, and (b) whatever the policy choice, the
type L regime and the type H auditor truthfully report the policy outcome of the current period.
Working backwards, consider a policy deviation by L to its one shot policy aL. Suppose that the
type L regime then chose to lie about its choice by reporting that it chose the equilibrium policy a∗∗
instead of reporting aL. Consider reporting incentives of type H auditor. If the auditor corroborates
31the lie, then its continuation is E[UH(α∗∗;ω0)
￿
￿
￿ ω]. If the auditor reports truthfully, then the simple
equilibrium prescribes some punishment path, call it αH, giving the auditor E[UH(αH;ω0)
￿ ￿
￿ ω].
Clearly, the type H auditor is indiﬀerent between any of the reports it might send. Otherwise, it








But the simple equilibrium prescribes αH for any deviation and for any state in ΩLH. Conse-





￿ ￿ ˆ ω]=uH(a∗∗). (17)
Recall that simple equilibria also prescribe a ﬁnite number of policies used in each path. Let ¯ u
denote the ﬁnite (column) vector of stage payoﬀs used in path αH. Now let Φ(ω) denote the ﬁnite
(row) probability vector from the distribution deﬁned in (15). Speciﬁcally, if uk is a component of












k is the nth passage time reaching uk.38 Hence, (17) can be expressed as
Φ(ω) · ¯ uH =Φ (ˆ ω) · ¯ uH = uH(a∗∗) (19)
By the full rank of the Markov transition matrix , it follows that, to satisfy (19), each element of
the vector ¯ u must be identically equal to uH(a∗∗). This means uH(aY n
ij)=uH(a∗∗) for all conditional
passage times Y n
ij. In other words, the continuation utility to high types in every passage date must
be the same and must coincide the equilibrium continuation utility. But since uH is single peaked,
there are at most two policies consistent with the same utility value. One of them is obviously the
equilibrium policy a∗∗. Let ˜ a denote the other policy.
To sum up, the reporting incentives for the high type of auditor implies either aT n
ij = a∗∗ or
aT n
ij =˜ a where uH(a∗∗)=uH(˜ a). Observe that since a∗∗ is an optimal policy, the policy ˜ a must lie
38We adopt the convention that Z
0
k =0i fu
k occurs in state ω and Z
0
k = ∞ otherwise.
32on the far side of type H’s peak relative to type L. This means that ˜ a 6= aL (the alternative policy
is not L’s one shot policy), and, in fact, regime L is worse oﬀ under the alternative policy ˜ a:
uL(a∗∗) >u L(˜ a) (20)
As for the policy incentives of type L regime, because type L regimes cannot take their one shot
policies along the punishment paths, each must cooperate in their own punishment by choosing
either a∗∗ or ˜ a. In order to induce type Ls to cooperate in this way, they must be induced by a ter-
minal reward. Hence, the path αH can be expressed as a path ˜ α(q) with q periods of “punishment”
remaining before returning to a terminal path ˜ α(0). The value VL(αH;ω) in a simple equilibrium
is, therefore,




where either a = a∗∗ or a =˜ a and E[UL(˜ α(q − 1);ω0)
￿
￿
￿ ω] >E [UL(˜ α(q);ω0)
￿
￿
￿ ω] in order to induce
the type L regime to cooperate in the current period.
In order to show that the policy incentive constraint holds for the type L regime when the prior
message-action history is expected to induce maximal punishment in the current period, we assert
from (21) that a necessary condition is
(1 − δ)[vL(aL) − vL(a∗∗)] <δ E
h











[uL(a∗∗) − uL(˜ a)]
(22)
To understand (22), the left hand side is the minimal one shot gain to a deviation to the one shot
policy. If the L regime cooperates in the current period gets at most uL(a∗∗). The right hand side
is the loss in expected continuation value from the current deviation. By choosing a∗∗ rather than
˜ a, the punishments must come in states in ΩHL ∪ ΩLH when the types diﬀerent from the auditor
hold power. The current choice of a∗∗ allows the regime is able to decrement the punishment by
one period at some future passage time. Since only two policies, a∗∗ and ˜ a are used along the path,
the loss from deviating against a∗∗ is uL(a∗∗) − uL(˜ a) in some future passage time provided that
states in either ΩLL or ΩHH are not reached ﬁrst.
Clearly, (22) contradicts (9). We conclude that α∗∗ is not sustainable by the simple, credible
communication equilibrium (µ,ρ,σ). ♦♦
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